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Abstract 
The Kakwani decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical and reranking terms 
is one of the most widely used tools in measurement of income redistribution. 
However, Urban (2009) argues that the decomposition features some methodological 
problems and calls for its reinterpretation. This paper builds several different 
measurement models, constructs new indices of redistributive effect and reranking 
reinventing the existing ones, and establishes important propositions on the role of 
reranking in the redistributive process. All this is done to prove that the standard 
interpretation of the Kakwani decomposition is misleading. New roles are suggested 
for the well-known indices of redistributive, vertical and reranking effect. 
 
Keywords: Kakwani decomposition, redistributive, reranking and vertical effects. 
JEL classifications: D63, H22, H23. 
 
 
                                                 
* Address of correspondence: ivica.urban@ijf.hr  2 
 
1  Introduction 
The Kakwani (1984) decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical and reranking 
indices became a cornerstone of the research on income redistribution. This is evidenced by the 
huge number of empirical studies employing it, and plenty of extensions and upgrades provided 
by its supporters. The popularity of this decomposition rests on its comprehensiveness (it 
captures different notions of redistributive justice), simplicity and ease of computation, and its 
availability for straightforward policy interpretation (redistributive power can be enhanced if 
horizontal inequity is reduced). 
Urban (2009) describes the origins of the Kakwani decomposition and reviews different 
other methodologies in decomposing the redistributive effect which are rooted in the Kakwani 
decomposition. This study reveals contrasting opinions of different scholars on the possibility, 
meaning and interpretation of the decomposition. Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981), who 
invented the reranking term, implicitly suggested to future users and developers to be cautious 
about the introduction of reranking into more comprehensive frameworks. Nonetheless, the 
Kakwani decomposition is exactly such a model capturing vertical equity and reranking. 
For Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) one of the weaknesses of Kakwani approach is the use of 
pre-tax income rankings: more reranking is regarded as favourable from the policy maker’s 
perspective and the increase in Atkinson-Plotnick reranking index automatically increases the 
Kakwani vertical effect. On the other hand, for both Kakwani (1984) and Lerman and Yitzhaki 
(1995), reranking has an active role in determination of the magnitude of the redistributive effect, 
and this is completely opposed to the views of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1980). Kakwani 
inspired many followers to claim that elimination of reranking would increase the redistributive 
effect. 
Therefore, the paper by Urban (2009) calls for more thorough research on these important 
problems. This paper represents such an investigation, attempting to explain the differences in 
approaches of different scholars and to discover which views are correct and to prove them. The 
main thesis of this paper is that reranking of income units cannot influence the redistributive 
effect. 3 
 
To defend this argument, two measurement systems, based on income vector transitions 
and income and rank distances between units, are carefully built. These approaches are already 
known in the literature on the Gini coefficient. Here we extend them to other indices and 
measures of the redistributive effect and reranking. New (and renewed old) concepts of distance 
narrowing, fiscal deprivation and domination are also presented. Following the derivation of all 
these measures, we compare them to indices and decompositions existing in the literature, and 
establish the relationships between them. 
The methodological apparatus developed here helps to develop important propositions 
about the fiscal process, which are then used to prove that Kakwani (1984) and Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1995) gave mistaken interpretations of the role of reranking in the redistributive 
process. After obtaining the proof, the two natural questions posed by researchers would be: 
How to proceed and which measures should be used? The answers are offered in the end of the 
paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section prepares a measurement model for 
subsequent analysis. The third section suggests certain arguments concerning the role of 
reranking in a redistributive process and proves them, using different approaches. It also explains 
how different measures of the redistributive effect and reranking behave in some specific 
circumstances. All this analysis leads us to the fourth section, in which final propositions and 
recipes for further research are presented. 
2  Measurement model 
Gini and concentration coefficients 
Variables, vectors and ordering of units 
First, let us define the ranking function  ) (a r , which returns a rank for each unit  k a  in 
vector a , such that the smallest element receives rank 1, etc.  
Let  
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such that  ) ( k y r i  . Observe the following distinction: 
y z  has the same values as z, but they are 
sorted in ascending order of y. Yet another variable, 
z y , can be defined analogously. 
“Distance from the mean” approach 
Equation (1) specifies Gini coefficient ( y G ). For each income unit with y-rank  i and 
value 
y
i y , the distance from the mean value  y  is weighted by  ) ( 2
1  i s , where s  is the highest 
rank. The weighted distances from mean are then averaged by 
2 s , and expressed as a share in the 
mean income. 
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The concentration coefficient is defined analogously. As equation (2) shows, for each 
income unit with z-rank  i and value 
z
i y , the distance from the mean value  y  is weighted. 
Remember that 
z
i y  contains values of y sorted using ranks from the vector z. 
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The Gini coefficient and concentration coefficient can be seen as members of a class of 
single-parameter or S-Gini coefficients, for which the parameter takes value  2   . In a discrete 
case, S-Gini is 
1 2 2
   y s Gy  
s
i i y y i ) )( ; (   , where   ) ; (   i    
  ) ( ) 1 ( i s i s    
1 /
  s . In 
(1) and (2), the term  2
1  i s  is actually the weighting scheme  ) ; (   i p  obtained for  2   . 
Since the number  2
1  in the term  2
1  i s  does not affect the estimate of Gini and concentration 
coefficients, we will ignore it for simplicity. We will introduce it again in welfare analysis. Thus, 
we can write: 
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“Distance between units” approach 
Another way to calculate Gini and concentration coefficients is based on the differences 
between income pairs (Lambert, 2001:34) and is even more straightforward. Instead of summing 
distances from the mean, formula (6) sums income distances between units, for all possible pairs 
) , ( j i . 














Notice the distinction between the terms of income difference and income distance. The 
former is presented by  j i y y  , and can be either positive or negative. The latter term,  j i y y  , 
is always positive as a result of absolute signs. Now, if instead of values  i y  and  j y , we decide to 
use 
y
i y  and 
y
j y , and if we take only the values such that i is always greater or equal to  j , then 
we can rewrite (5) to obtain Gini coefficient of  y, as shown by (6). Analogously, replacing 
y
i y  
and 
y
j y  in (6) with 
z
i y  and 
z
j y , we obtain the concentration coefficient of  y with respect to z, as 
in (7). 




































For illustrative purposes and easier derivation of other indices later, we draw matrices of 




i y y j i   ) , ( M , defined only for  j i  . Because the numbers in these 
matrices fill only the space on one side of the diagonal, we call them triangular. It is shown in 
general form by Figure 1. Since diagonal elements are always equal to zero, the presentation of 
the matrix can be reduced to the form presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1: “Full” triangular matrix 
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Figure 2: Compact triangular matrix 
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Equations (6) and (7) can be rewritten in the light of this reduced form of the matrix 
presentation. 












































In all subsequent analysis we will present the formulas in this same form of the matrix 
presentation. Therefore, it will always be assumed that  j i  . A useful property should be 
remembered, presented in (10). 




i j i y y y y    , for all  ) , ( j i  such that  j i   7 
 
Lorenz and concentration curves approach 
As the third way of presenting Gini and concentration coefficients, we mention the 
original approach that uses Lorenz and the concentration curves. Lorenz curve abscissas are 
cumulative proportions of units,  i p , and ordinates are cumulative proportions of the variable 
considered,  ) (i Ly . Equations (9) and (10) are used to obtain them: 
(11)    
s
i
pi   











) (  
The Gini coefficient is defined as double the area between the line of absolute equality 
and Lorenz curve. The line of absolute equality presents a situation in which all values of y are 
equal to  y . Notice that in this case Lorenz curve would be equal to: 
















In the discrete case we deal here with, the Gini can be approximated as double the 
average of distances between the line of absolute equality and Lorenz curve,  ) ( i y p L . 





























































Similarly, the concentration coefficient can be calculated, using the concentration curve 
) ( i
z
y p C  instead of Lorenz curve, as presented in (15). 
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Analysis of income transitions 
Income variables 
X  and N  are vectors of pre-fiscal and post-fiscal income, respectively; the  j th entry of 
X ,  j X , and the  j th entry of N ,  j N , present income information for the particular income unit 
j . Vectors 
x X , 
n X , 
n N  and 
x N  are different sortings of vectors X  and N , as explained in the 
previous section.  
Table 1 shows a hypothetical population of five and their income vectors X  and N . In 
these original vectors, the units take either random or alphabetic (perhaps, according to family 
names) or some other order, independent of incomes. Columns  ) (X r  and  ) (N r  present ranks of 
units according to pre- and post-fiscal income. We observe they are not identical: indeed each 
unit changes its rank in the transition from pre- to post-fiscal income. 
Table 1 Hypothetical data set 
Unit  X   N   ) (X r   ) (N r     Unit  x X  
x N     Unit 
n X  
n N  
A  180 80  5  4    D 8  40    C 70  20 
B  30 100  3  5    E 12  60    D 8  40 
C  70 20  4  1    B 30  100    E 12  60 
D  8 40  1  2    C 70  20    A 180  80 
E  12 60  2  3    A 180  80    B 30  100 
In the second step, we sort units in ascending order of pre-fiscal income and create 
vectors 
x X  and 
x N . Notice that the 1
st place in 
x X  and 
x N  is taken by the unit with pre-fiscal 
rank 1 (unit D), the 2
nd place is taken by the unit with pre-fiscal rank 2 (unit E) etc. In the similar 
way, but using N-ranks, we create vectors 
n X  and 
n N . The 1
st place is taken by the unit with 
post-fiscal rank 1 (C), …, the 5
th place is occupied by the unit with post-fiscal rank 5 (B). 
We can see from this example that pre-fiscal and post-fiscal rankings of units, represented 
by  ) (X r  and  ) (N r , are not necessarily identical, and in reality they are certainly not. The 
difference in them is a consequence of the “process” we will call reranking to which we will 
devote a great deal of attention in what follows. 9 
 
Transitions from pre- to post-fiscal income 
By means of redistributive effects we will treat various transitions from pre- to post-fiscal 
income, but also the transitions from pre- to pre- and post- to post-fiscal income. For each 
transition we derive a specific index of the redistributive effect. Later we will develop further 
distinct concepts of income distance narrowing, fiscal deprivation / domination, and deprivation / 
domination due to reranking, and see how these are connected with the redistributive effects. 
From pre-fiscal vector X  and post-fiscal vector N , we have derived four ordered 
vectors: 
x X , 
n X , 
x N  and 
n N  which form the basis of the analysis. We will first concentrate on 
the transitions from pre- to post-fiscal incomes, and leave the transitions from pre- to pre- and 
post- to post-fiscal income for the next section.  
We have four possible transitions from pre- to post-fiscal income: 
(a) 
x X →




i N );     (b) 
n X →




i N ) 
(c) 
x X →




i N );   (d) 
n X →




i N ). 
In transitions 
x X →
x N  and 
n X →
n N , the pre-fiscal income of one unit is compared to 
the post-fiscal income of the same unit. In transition 
x X →
n N , the pre-fiscal income of the unit 
with pre-fiscal rank i is compared to the post-fiscal income of the unit with post-fiscal rank i. In 
transition 
n X →
x N , the pre-fiscal income of the unit with post-fiscal rank i is compared to the 
post-fiscal income of the unit with pre-fiscal rank i. In the presence of reranking, these are 
different units. Thus, for transitions (c) and (d), the link between pre-fiscal and post-fiscal 
income will not be actual but counterfactual. In the rest of the analysis, we will concentrate on 
the first three transitions. 
These aspects are illustrated in Table 2, based on the hypothetical data set from the 
previous table. For the first two transitions, the pre-fiscal income of unit D is transformed into 
the post-fiscal income of unit D (and so for the other four units). However, for the third 
transition, the pre-fiscal income of D is transformed into the post-fiscal income of unit C; E is 




Table 2: Transitions from pre- to post-fiscal income 
x X →
x N     n X →
n N     x X →
n N  
Unit 
x
i X   Unit 
x
i N     Unit 
n
i X   Unit 
n
i N     Unit 
x
i X   Unit 
n
i N  
D 8  D  40    C 70  C  20    D 8  C  20 
E 12  E 60    D 8  D  40    E 12  D 40 
B 30  B  100    E 12  E  60    B 30  E 60 
C 70  C 20    A 180  A 80    C 70  A 80 
A 180  A  80    B 30  B  100    A 180  B 100 
Transitions from pre- to pre- and from post- to post-fiscal income 
In the previous section we have analyzed transitions from pre- to post-fiscal income. It 
was indicated that other transitions are also possible: from pre- to pre-fiscal income, and from 
post- to post-fiscal income. The former occurs between 
n N  and 
x N , and the latter between 
x X  
and 
n X , as follows: 
(a) 
n N →




i N ) 
(b) 
x X →




i X ) 
In the transition 
n N →
x N , the post-fiscal income of the unit with post-fiscal rank i is 
compared to the post-fiscal income of the unit with pre-fiscal rank i. In presence of reranking, 
these are different units. The same relates to the transition 
x X →
n X , where the pre-fiscal income 
of the unit with pre-fiscal rank i translates into the pre-fiscal income of the unit with post-fiscal 
rank i. 
This is illustrated in Table 3. The post-fiscal income of unit C is transformed into the 
post-fiscal income of unit D, D is translated into E, E into B, etc. The pre-fiscal income of unit D 
is translated into the pre-fiscal income of unit C, etc.  
Table 3: Transitions from pre- to pre- and from post- to post-fiscal income 
n N →
x N     x X →
n X  
Unit 
n
i N   Unit 
x
i N     Unit 
x
i X   Unit 
n
i X  
C 20  D 40    D 8  C  70 
D 40  E 60    E 12  D  8 
E 60  B  100    B 30  E 12 
A 80  C 20    C 70  A  180 
B 100  A  80    A 180  B  30 11 
 
Indices of the redistributive effect 
All measurement in this study is based upon the concepts of Gini and the concentration 
coefficients. There are many different ways to calculate them; three methods are used here, 
which have been explained above. The redistributive effect and other indices, are also formed on 
the basis of Gini and the concentration coefficients.  
Throughout the text, we assume that average post- and pre-fiscal incomes are equal, 
X N  . This enables easier derivation of the formulas and later we make adaptations to account 
for the case where  X N  . 
For the first three transitions from pre- to post-fiscal income explained in the previous 
section, we have the following three indices of the redistributive effect, shown in (16), (17) and 
(18). For the two other transitions, from pre- to pre- and post- to post-fiscal income, we have two 
additional indices of the redistributive effect, presented in (19) and (20). 
For transition 
x X →
x N , the index is 
x RE : 
(16)  
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For transition 
n X →
n N , the index is 
n RE : 
(17) 
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For transition 
x X →
n N , the index is 
xn RE : 
(18) 








i X N i s c
1




















    





i X i N p L p L
s 1
) ( ) (
2
  N X G G    
For transition 
n N →
x N , the index is 
rx RE : 12 
 
(19)  
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For transition 
x X →
n X , the index is 
rn RE : 
(20)  








i X X i s c
1




















    







X p L p C
s 1




X X D G    
where the value of c is equal to  N s c
2 / 1  . 
Income distance, fiscal deprivation and domination 
Fiscal deprivation 
At the same time transitions from pre-fiscal to post-fiscal income induce changes in 
income distances and changes of income ranks. In this section, we will scrutinize the 
redistributive process at the level of two income units, and afterwards, the relations will be 
aggregated to the level of the whole population. This will result in new indices of distance 
narrowing and reranking. 
Suppose that two income units have pre-fiscal incomes 
x
i X  and 
x




i X X   
and  j i  . Their respective post-fiscal incomes are 
x
i N  and 
x
j N . First, let us define distance 
narrowing ( j i,  ). 
(21)     j i j i j i N N X X      ,  
If the distance between units is narrowed, we have that  0 ,   j i ; if it is widened, there is 
0 ,   j i . Next, we will define the deprivation due to reranking (
x
j i r, ) of the unit with pre-fiscal 
rank i, that may be reranked by the unit with rank  j . 13 
 


















i N N  , there is no reranking and  0 , 
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i N N  , it means that 






j i N N r   , .
1 Finally, let us define the fiscal deprivation (
x
j i,  ) of the unit with pre-fiscal income rank 
i, over the unit with pre-fiscal income rank  j . 










j i N N X X     ,   
The three measures defined above are connected as shown by the following equation. 
(24)    
x
j i j i
x
j i r, , , 2      




i X X   denotes “income supremacy” of i over  j . Say that i worked harder, and now enjoys 




i X X   measures the intensity of this “feeling”. However, 




i N N  . Thus, the term 
x
j i,   
(23) signifies the change of income advantage of i over  j , in the transition from pre- to post-
fiscal income. If i loses a part of this advantage or supremacy ( 0 , 
x
j i  ), we say that she is 
“fiscally deprived”, and hence the name for the term. Fiscal deprivation can be divided (24) into 
two components: distance narrowing ( j i,  ) and reranking (
x
j i r, 2 ). 
Now, assume that the units with ranks i and  j  are informed that, in order to improve 
social welfare, the income distance between i and  j  will be reduced by  j i
T
j i X X    , . What 
may be the consequences of this action on the “income supremacy” of i, i.e. how large could her 
                                                      
1 Notice that “deprivation due to reranking” closely resembles the concept of „fiscal looseness“ presented by Duclos 
(2000). 14 
 
fiscal deprivation be? In the case of no reranking, fiscal deprivation will be equal to 
T
j i,  . In the 




j i r, , 2   .
2 
Assume that “society” agrees that certain distance narrowing is desirable between i and 
j , i.e. i must sacrifice part of her “income supremacy”. However, it is also required that pre-
fiscal rankings should not be altered, i.e. i must remain “the rich”, and  j  “the poor”. In this 
light, we may treat the reranking component of fiscal deprivation (
x
j i r, 2 ) as an excess fiscal 
deprivation felt by i. 
Fiscal domination 
Two income units have post-fiscal incomes 
n
i N  and 
n




i N N   and  j i  . 
Their respective pre-fiscal incomes are 
n
i X  and 
n
j X .  Distance narrowing ( j i,  ) is already 
defined in (21). Here we also define distance widening as negative distance narrowing. 
(25)     j i j i , ,      
Let us define the domination due to reranking (
n
j i r, ) of the unit with post-fiscal rank i, 
that might have reranked the unit with post-fiscal rank  j . 


















i X X  , there was no reranking and  0 , 
n




i X X  , it means that 






j i X X r   , . Finally, we will define the fiscal domination (
n
j i,  ) 
of the unit with post-fiscal income rank i, over the unit with post-fiscal income rank  j , as in 
(27). 










j i X X N N     ,   
                                                      
2 Is it “just” that i must sacrifice 
T
j i,   of her income supremacy? For a “libertarian”, the only permissible situation 
is  0 ,  
T
j i . For an “equalitarian”, the perfect situation would be that  j i
T
j i X X    , , so that  j i N N  . 
Usually, we would say that it is “just” that  0 ,  
T
j i , but the allowed magnitude of 
T
j i,   would vary. 15 
 
The relationship between the measures is represented by the following equation. 
(28)    
n
j i j i
n
j i j i
n





i N N   denotes the post-fiscal “income supremacy” of i over  j . The 
former unit enjoys higher income, either because she worked harder (whereby earning higher 
pre-fiscal income), or as a consequence of the fiscal process. Fiscal domination (
n
j i,  ) measures a 
change of i’s “income supremacy” in the transition from pre- to post-fiscal income. This change 
can be arrived at through two channels: distance widening ( j i,  ) and reranking (
n
j i r, 2 ). On the 
other hand, distance narrowing ( j i j i , ,    ) reduces fiscal domination. 
The decomposition (28) also tells us that, for given  j i,  , fiscal domination will be larger, 
the higher reranking is . Therefore, we may treat 
n
j i r, 2  as an augmented fiscal domination of the 
unit with post-fiscal rank i. 
Comparison of the approaches 
Compare the role of reranking in this and the previous section: it increases both fiscal 
domination (28) and fiscal deprivation (24). Since domination and deprivation are opposite 
terms, it means that reranking plays a reverse role in the two approaches: it is “bad” when 
causing excess fiscal deprivation (24), but it is “good” when it enhances fiscal domination (28). 
The concept of fiscal domination is somewhat odd because it favours (assuming that a 
positive value of a measure means “good”) both distance widening and reranking, two concepts 
that are usually disapproved of. 
Indices of change in distance narrowing, fiscal deprivation and domination 
In the previous two sections, we have defined exactly five new terms related to distances 
and ranks of income units. All these terms were defined for pairs of units  ) , ( j i . Fortunately, we 
can easily aggregate them to obtain indices that reflect these concepts for the whole population 
of units. 
The index of distance narrowing,  , is derived from (21). By rule (10), we have that 








i N N    for all  ) , ( j i  where  j i  . 16 
 


































The index of deprivation due to reranking, 
x R , is derived from (22). 
























The fiscal deprivation index, 
x V , is derived from (23). 
(31)    





















The index of domination due to reranking, 
n R , is derived from (26). 
























The reverse fiscal domination index, 
n V , is derived from (27). The “true” index of fiscal 
domination would be 
n V  , but this reversal was done for easier alignment with other indices as 
will be witnessed later. 






















Relationships between new and existing indices 
We have already defined a number of different concepts, terms and indices above. At this 
point we have to reveal the relationships between them, and with measures already present in the 
literature. As we will see, all the new indices have their traditional correspondents. Urban (2009) 
provides detailed overview of the latter indices, and here we briefly summarize them. The 
“classical” or standard index of the redistributive effect (RE ), the Kakwani (1977; 1984) index 
of vertical effect (
K V ), the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) index of “gap narrowing” (
LY V ), 
Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) index of reranking (
AP R ), and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) 
index of reranking (
LY R ), are respectively defined in equations (34) through (38). 17 
 
(34)     N X G G RE    
(35)    
x
N X
K D G V    
(36)     N
n
X
LY G D V    
(37)    
x
N N
AP D G R    
(38)    
n
X X
LY D G R    
The index of the redistributive effect 
xn RE  in (18), has the same content as the index of 
distance narrowing  in (29), and is identical to the standard redistributive effect RE  in (34). 
(39)     RE RE
xn     
The index of the redistributive effect 
x RE  in (16), and the fiscal deprivation index 
x V  in 
(31), correspond to Kakwani index of vertical effect 
K V  in (35). 
(40)    
K x x V V RE    
The index of the redistributive effect 
n RE  in  (17) and the reverse fiscal domination 
index 
n V  in (33) correspond to Lerman-Yitzhaki index of “gap narrowing” 
LY V  in (36). 
(41)    
LY n n V V RE    
The index of the redistributive effect 
rx RE  in (19) equals twice the index of deprivation 
due to reranking 
x R  in (30), and is identical to Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking 
AP R  in 
(37). 
(42)    
AP x rx R R RE   2 
The index of the redistributive effect 
rn RE  in  (20) is equal to twice the index of 
domination due to reranking 
n R  in (32), and has the same content as Lerman-Yitzhaki index of 
reranking 
LY R  in (38). 
(43)    
LY n rn R R RE   2 18 
 
3  Properties of the redistributive effects, distance narrowing and reranking 
The arguments 
Above we have defined indices of the redistributive effect, and of distance narrowing and 
reranking. Now we reveal their interrelatedness and present several important properties. The 
sections that follow aim to explain and prove the following three arguments. They are important 
for deriving the main conclusions about the Kakwani and Lerman-Yitzhaki decompositions in 
the section 4. 
(1)  Distance narrowing and reranking are independent 
(2)  Elimination of reranking cannot change the extent of distance narrowing 
(3)  Redistributive effects can be presented as combinations of distance narrowing and 
reranking 
Distance narrowing and reranking as separate effects 
In this section, we prove the Argument 1, that distance narrowing and reranking are 
distinct and independent concepts. Imagine that we have two lottery boxes, one with balls 
representing pre-fiscal and the other post-fiscal incomes. We draw the balls one by one randomly 
and simultaneously from both boxes, and write the combination on the board, creating vectors X  
and N , with pairs  ) , ( i i N X , as in Table 1. 
Now, observe the formula (29) for distance narrowing and imagine that we repeat the 
lottery, obtaining many combinations. The fact is that, for each combination, the index  will be 
the same. The distance narrowing index does not depend on the order in which the units are 
drawn (sorted, ranked). Recall now the two formulas for deprivation / domination due to 
reranking, (30) and (32). The situation is quite different for reranking: each combination will 
result in different values of the indices 
rx RE  and 
rn RE .  
For given vectors X  and N , imagine a process of income swapping within any pair of 
units, so that the first unit obtains the post-fiscal income of the other, and vice versa. Referring to 
the above, we conclude that such swapping will affect reranking, but not distance narrowing. 
We have seen that identity exists between indices 
xn RE  and . We may conclude that 
the redistributive effect 
xn RE , except that depicting the transition 
x X →
n N , is also a true 19 
 
measure of distance narrowing. This has some important implications: 
xn RE , in the same way as 
, is not sensitive to income ranks. Given the elements of the vectors X  and N , for any actual 
permutation of 
x N  and 
n X , the indices  and 
xn RE  will have the same values. 
Thus, 
xn RE  fully registers the distance narrowing effect induced by the fiscal system. At 
the same time, it is completely indifferent about rank changes of the units in the transition from 
pre-fiscal to post-fiscal income. These are important messages to users of the index, having a 
normative significance that should not be neglected. Thus, if we use 
xn RE  as our sole measure of 
the redistributive effect, it means the following:  
(a) We do not care about the reranking of units in the transition from pre- to post-fiscal 
income;  
(b) Any final or post-fiscal ranking of units is equally good;  
(c) Reranking is neither good nor bad: it does not improve nor does it weaken inequality 
reduction. 
To illustrate the meaning of these conclusions, imagine a case of three units A, B and C, 
with pre-fiscal incomes 10, 20 and 60. An “equalitarian” would like to see the following post-
fiscal incomes: 30, 30 and 30. In this case, maximum distance narrowing  and the 
redistributive effect 
xn RE  would be achieved,  X
xn G RE    . 
In an alternative setting, let the post-fiscal incomes of A, B and C be the following: 60, 20 
and 10. Thus, C transferred 50 money units to A, and became the “new poor” member of society, 
while A became the “new rich”. In this case we have that  0 
xn RE , and obviously, everything 
that one would conclude solely through inspecting 
xn RE  is that the fiscal system did not change 
the inequality. On the other hand, quite a lot of redistribution has occurred, probably beyond 
what many observers would regard as acceptable or sustainable. But, 
xn RE  is completely silent 
about reranking between A and C. How do the other two redistributive effects react? 
Impact of a reranking-eliminating transfer 
This section and the next one aim to prove Argument 2, regarding the following question: 
If reranking is somehow eliminated, what would be the impact of that change on the 
redistributive effect? To answer the question, we must first determine how the reranking could 20 
 
be eliminated. Unfortunately, we are not offered the recipe. However, there is one very intuitive 
way to achieve this: through transfer of post-fiscal income from the outranking unit to the unit 
that was outranked. Let us see how such transfer would affect different measures of income 
redistribution: vertical effect, reranking and the redistributive effect. 
A and B are units with pre-fiscal incomes 
x
u X  and 
x





u X X   and consequently  v u  . The fiscal process has resulted in reranking, and A 




u N N 0 , 0 ,  . The post-fiscal ranks of units A and B are  y 
and  z, where  z y  , because of reranking. Their pre-fiscal incomes are 
n
y X 0 ,  and 
n




y X X 0 , 0 ,  .  
Assume that we want to eliminate reranking between these two units through a transfer of 



























u N N 0 , 0 ,     of post-fiscal income from unit A with pre-fiscal (post-fiscal) rank u  
( y) to unit B with pre-fiscal (post-fiscal) rank v (z) induces a change of: 
(a)  The Kakwani vertical effect 
K V  and Atkinson-Plotnick reranking effect 
AP R  by 
) ( 2 v u c   . 
(b)  The Lerman-Yitzhaki vertical effect 




y X X y z c    and the Lerman-
Yitzhaki reranking effect 




y X X y z c    . 
Proof. 
(a)  First, observe that reranking-inducing transfer of post-fiscal income does not change the 
order of units in 
x
i N . The changes in post-fiscal incomes are equal to: 










u N N N N N 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , ; 21 
 










v N N N N N 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , . 
Recall formulas (16) for 
K x V RE  , and (19) for 
AP rx R RE  . We may abstract from all the fixed 
elements and concentrate only on the changes 
x
u N   and 
x
v N  . The changes of 
K V  and 
AP R  are 
then equal to: 
 ) ( 2 ) ( ) )( ( 2 v u c v s u s c V
K            . 
 ) ( 2 ) ( ) )( ( 2 v u c v s u s c R
AP            . 
(b)  Notice that the order of units in vector 
n
i X  changes because of the reranking-inducing 




















z X X X X X 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 ,      . 




y X X 0 , 0 ,
~    . Recall formulas (17) 
for 
LY n V RE  , and (20) for 
LY rn R RE  . The changes of 
LY V  and 
LY R  are as follows: 





LY X z s X y s c V         ) ~ )( ( )) ~ ( )( ( 2   z s y s c  





LY X X y z c y z c V        . 





LY X z s X y s c R         ~ ) ( ) ~ )( ( 2 z s y s c  





LY X X y z c y z c R          . 
From Proposition 1 we conclude that this transfer of post-fiscal income between the two 
units, which is equal to the difference between their post-fiscal incomes, does not affect the 
redistributive effect. Let us see how: 
(a)  The change of Kakwani vertical effect is identical to the change of Atkinson-
Plotnick reranking index:  ) ( 2 v u c R V
AP K       . Therefore 
0      
AP K R V RE .  22 
 
(b)  The change of Lerman-Yitzhaki vertical effect is the same in absolute amount, but 
of opposite sign from, the change in the reranking effect: 




v X X v w c    . Therefore   RE 0    
LY LY R V . 
Now, imagine a series of reranking-eliminating transfers   between different units in the 
population. Each transfer has impact on vertical and reranking indices as shown above, and the 
total effect is equal to the sum of single impacts. If the transfer process is guided in a specific 
way, full values of reranking indices can be restored. 
Robin Hood regards the current post-fiscal situation, presented in Table 4, as 
unacceptable, because there is too much reranking. Pre-fiscal income is already earned and 
cannot be changed or influenced (this is a usual assumption in the analysis of income 
redistribution). Also, assume that at the moment additional taxes cannot be collected and neither 
do there exist some reserve funds from which cash benefits could be paid. In this situation, in 
order to fix the problem, Robin Hood must rely on transfers of post-fiscal income between 
reranked units: to take from the undeservingly rich and give to the harmed poor. 
Table 4 presents incomes of five hypothetical units from Table 1. According to Robin 
Hood’s report, the harmed units are C, who had pre-fiscal rank  4  i  and post-fiscal rank of only 
1  k , and A, with pre-fiscal rank  5  i  and post-fiscal rank  4  k . Three units (D, E and B) 
outranked C, while A was outranked by one unit (B). 
A series of transfers occurred in four steps described in Table 5 and Table 6. We will 
concentrate on the former table, while for the latter, the interpretation is analogous. As can be 
seen in column 2 of Table 5, in the first step a transfer of  20  t   goes from D to C, enlarging the 
income of C by 20, and decreasing the income of D by the same amount. The consequence is a 
decrease of 
AP R  by  60 2     c R
AP  (observe that incomes of units participating in transfers are 
in bold letters).  
During the first three steps, C’s income has grown to 100, 20 more than he ‘deserves’. 
Thus, in the fourth step, a transfer of 20 goes from C to A, and in column 6 we see the final 
vector of post-fiscal incomes. We reveal what was Robin Hood’s idea: to achieve that pre-fiscal 
rankings are preserved in the final state. Summing the values in the last row of Table 5, we can 23 
 
see that during the transfer process the index 
AP R  fell by  160 2     c R
AP  in total, which is 
exactly the starting value of 
AP R : in the end there is no reranking. 
Notice also that by Proposition 1(a), 
K V  must have also been changed by the same 
amount of  160 2     c V
K , leaving the redistributive effect RE  unchanged. The Lerman-
Yitzhaki index of reranking has changed by  310 2     c R
LY , as shown in the bottom row of 
Table 6, while according to Proposition 1(b), the vertical effect increased by  310 2     c V
LY . 
Table 4: Hypothetical case 
Unit  i 
x
i X  
x
i N    Unit  k  
n
k X  
n
k N  
D 1  8 40    C 1 70 20 
E 2 12 60    D 2  8 40 
B 3 30  100    E 3 12 60 
C 4 70 20    A 4  180 80 
A 5  180 80    B 5 30  100 
 
Table 5: A series of transfers and a change in Atkinson-Plotnick reranking 
i 
x
i N 1 ,
x
i N   
x
i N 2 ,  
x
i N 3 ,  
x
i N 4 ,  
x
i N 1 ,
n
i N   
1  2  3 4 5 6 
1  40  20 20 20 20 
2 60  60  40 40 40 
3 100  100  100  60 60 
4  20 40  60 100  80 
5 80  80  80  80  100 
t v   1  2 3 4   
x
t v N ,   40 60 100 100   
t w   4  4 4 5   
x
t w N ,   20  40 60 80   
t    20  20 40 20   
 ) ( w v    –60  –40  –40  –20    160 
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Table 6: A series of transfers and a change in Lerman-Yitzhaki reranking 
k  
n
k X 1 ,
n
k X   
n
k X 2 ,  
n
k X 3 ,  
n
k X 4 ,  
n
k X 5 ,
x
k X   
1  2  3 4 5 6 
1  70  8  8 8 8 
2  8 70  12 12 12 
3 12  12  70  30  30 
4 180  180  180  180  70 
5 30  30  30 70  180 
t v ~   1  2 3 4   
n
t v X ,   70 70  70 180   
t w ~   2  3 5 5   
n
t w X ,   8  12 30 70   
 ~  62 58  40 110   
 ~ ) ~ ~ ( v w     –62  –58  –80  –110    310 
 
However, one may wonder: is there any other model of change in the income distribution 
that would show something different? We can experiment with the following option: A and B are 








a N N 1   . 




a N N      from A 
to B, in which case they would have the same incomes. It can be shown that this process would 
decrease 
AP R  by  0 4  c , while the decrease of 
K V  would be only  0 2  c , with the final 
consequence: a rise in RE  by  0 2  c !  
However, a careful analysis reveals that the above process can be divided into two parts:  




a N N  from A to B that eliminates reranking and reduces both 
AP R  and 
K V  by  0 1 4 2   c c   (thus,  0  RE ), and  




a N N  from B to A, that equalizes their incomes, 
and increases both 
K V  and RE  by  0 2 2 2   c c  . 
The crucial point is that the increase of the redistributive effect caused by transfer  0   is 
not a consequence of reranking elimination, but of income equalization or distance narrowing 
between units A and B. 25 
 
Decompositions of the redistributive effects 
This section is devoted to Argument 3, which claimed that the redistributive effects can 
be presented as combinations of distance narrowing and reranking. First, we deal with the 
redistributive effect 
x RE  and after that with 
n RE . We also establish a relationship between these 
and other indices presented earlier in the text.  
The redistributive effect 
x RE  depicts the transition 
x x N X  . The same superscript x in 
both 
x X  and 
x N  symbolizes that the transition preserves pre-fiscal income ranks. Let us break 
this transition into two sub-transitions: 
(44)    
x x N X    
n x N X    
x n N N   
The first sub-transition, 
n x N X  , ascribes to each unit with pre-fiscal income rank i 
and pre-fiscal income 
x
i X  its counterfactual post-fiscal income 
n
i N ; 
n
i N  is a post-fiscal income 
of the unit with rank i on the post-fiscal ranking scale. Thus, the sub-transition 
n x N X   breaks 
the ranking link. Another sub-transition, 
x n N N  , restores the ranking link between pre- and 
post-fiscal income. 












i N N   . Summing over  ) , ( j i  and multiplying 
by c we obtain: 






































































































Comparing (45) with (16), (18), (19), (29), (30) and (40) we reach several conclusions. 
First, the redistributive effect 
x RE  can be decomposed into a sum of the redistributive effects 
xn RE  and 
rx RE .  
(46)    
rx xn x RE RE RE    26 
 
Second, the redistributive effect 
x RE , which corresponds to the fiscal deprivation index 
x V , can be decomposed into distance narrowing and deprivation due to reranking effects. 
(47)    
x x x R V RE 2 ) (      
Third, when (46) or (47) is translated into terms of traditional indices, we obtain that the 
Kakwani vertical effect 
K V  (
x x V RE   ) is the sum of the redistributive effect RE  
(   
xn RE ) and the Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking 
AP R  (
x rx R RE 2   ). 
(48)    
AP K R RE V    
We conclude that 
K V  is composed of distance narrowing and reranking. The 
identification of 
K V  with 
x V  results in further interesting conclusions.  ) (
x K V V   now also 
represents total fiscal deprivation, and should be compared to total reduction of income distance 
. The difference between these two is the excess fiscal deprivation ( RE V R
K AP   ), the part 
of total 
K V  not necessary to achieve actual distance narrowing . 
The redistributive effect 
n RE  explains the transition 
n X →
n N . The superscript n in both 
vectors means that the transition preserves post-fiscal ranking. As in the previous section, we 
break this transition into two sub-transitions. The decomposition is slightly more complicated, 
with minus signs meaning the transition goes in the opposite direction. 
(49)    
n n N X    
n n X N    
      
n x x n X X X N           
n x n x X X N X       
  
n x N X   
n x X X    
The first sub-transition, 
n x N X  , is distance narrowing and breaks the ranking link. 
However, another sub-transition, 













i X X   . Summing over  ) , ( j i  and multiplying by c we obtain: 27 
 






































































































Comparing (50) with (17), (19), (20), (32), (33) and (41) we may reach several 
conclusions. Firstly, the redistributive effect 
n RE  can be decomposed into difference of 
xn RE  
and 
rx RE .  
(51)    
rn xn n RE RE RE    
Secondly, the redistributive effect 
n RE , which is identical to the reverse fiscal 
domination index 
n V , can be decomposed into effects of distance narrowing and domination due 
to reranking. 
(52)    
n n n R V RE 2 ) (      
Finally, “translating” (51) and (52), we obtain a decomposition of Lerman-Yitzhaki index 
of “progressivity” 
LY V  (
n n V RE   ) into the redistributive effect RE  (   
xn RE ) and the 
Lerman-Yitzhaki index of reranking 
LY R  (
n rn R RE 2   ). 
(53)    
LY LY R RE V    
It can be seen that 
LY V , just as 
K V , can be decomposed into distance narrowing and 
reranking. 
Analysis: a series of small transfers between two units 
This section again relies on an experiment with transfers, but this time we deal with a 
series of small transfers. Up to now, we have not considered the meaning of the weights in the 
Gini index,  i s pi   ) 2 ; (  , described earlier. Interpretation is straightforward: the units with 
lower positions i receive larger weights, and vice versa. It can be shown that a small transfer   28 
 
from the unit with rank v to the unit with rank  v w   will decrease the Gini coefficient by 
) ( 2 w v c   . 
A small transfer from the rich to the poor decreases inequality and increases welfare 
because the sacrifice felt by the rich is valued as less important than the marginal benefit to the 
poor. We must stress that the terms “poor” and “rich” correspond to the relative positions of 
persons involved, before and after the transfer. 
Now, imagine a series of small transfers from the rich B to the poor A. Obviously, after 
each of these transfers B will be becoming less rich and A will be getting less poor: the income 
distance between them will be narrowing and the income supremacy of B will be falling. In one 
moment, these persons’ incomes will be equalized. After that point, the next small transfer from 
B to A will reverse the situation: the “poor” A will become the rich one, and the “rich” B will 
become the poor. Reranking occurs. Suppose that the transfers continue to the point where B and 
A completely swap their incomes. How do the measurement concepts analyzed in this study 
respond to the challenge? We analyze the changes of our indices during a series of small 
transfers between two hypothetical units in the following example. 
The transfer process is presented both in Table 7 and Figure 3. Unit A starts with income 
of 10 and ends with 20, while it is the opposite for B. There are ten steps, each presenting a small 
transfer of 1 monetary unit (not all steps are shown in the table, for better visibility). Indices of 
the redistributive effect and reranking for each step are all calculated with respect to step 0. Thus, 
for example, indices in step 7 are based on pre-fiscal incomes 10 and 20, and post-fiscal incomes 
17 and 13, for A and B respectively. 
 
Table 7: Small transfers and indices of the redistributive effect 
Step  0 1 3 5 6 7 9  10 
 
Income of A  10 11 13 15 16 17 19 20 
Income of B  20 19 17 15 14 13 11 10 
 
RE   0 0.033 0.100 0.167 0.133 0.100 0.033  0 
K V   0 0.033 0.100 0.167 0.200 0.233 0.300 0.333 
AP R   0 0 0 0  0.067  0.133  0.267  0.333 
LY V   0 0.033 0.100 0.167  -0.200  -0.233  -0.300  -0.333 
LY R   0 0 0 0  0.333  0.333  0.333  0.333 
AP R RE    0 0.033 0.100 0.167 0.067  -0.033  -0.233  -0.333 
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In the first 5 steps, there is no reranking ( 0  
LY AP R R ), and therefore the three 
redistributive effects are identical: 
LY K V V RE   . In the 5
th step, the incomes are equalized and 
the distance narrowing (   RE ) reaches its maximum of 0.167. After this point, the 
redistributive effects completely diverge: (a) RE  falls back toward zero; (b) 
K V  continues to 
grow; (c) 
LY V  has a breaking point at the 5
th step, when it drops significantly and continues to 
fall in later steps. Reranking effects also behave differently. 
LY R  is equal for all steps after the 
5
th, while 
AP R  grows toward the value of 
K V  in the 10
th step. 
Figure 3: Small transfers and indices of the redistributive effect 
 
 
As a potpourri to the discussion of the above hypothetical results, we cite a lucid 
argument delivered by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995), in their critique of Kakwani vertical effect:  
Imagine a rich taxpayer who becomes poor because of heavy taxation. According to before-tax 
rankings, the taxpayer will continue to be considered as rich even if the tax causes him to become 
poor. Reliance on the before-tax ranking may lead the analyst to recommend increasing a tax on 
progressivity grounds even though the additional tax will be paid by the poor. 
And this is exactly what we can conclude observing the development of 
K V  in our 
example, after the reranking has occurred in the 5
th step. In subsequent steps, unit B, who was 
rich, now becomes poorer and poorer, but 
K V  increases yet further. Thus the measure 
K V  
“rewards” reranking, which looks contradictory since we know that it is based on pre-fiscal 30 
 
ranks, and given that fact, it should “protect” the pre-fiscally richer. To our surprise, this is 
achieved by 
LY V , the measure based on post-fiscal ranks. 
LY V  falls as we go to the right from the 
5
th step, thus “penalizing” reranking. 
Our example confirms that Lerman and Yitzhaki were right when saying that dependence 
on pre-fiscal ranks would lead the analyst to recommend more redistribution even when 
reranking has occurred and the formerly rich became the poor. 
K V  continues to rise even when 
the “rich” person is left with zero or negative income. This was one of the reasons which caused 
them to propose their index 
LY V , which is attractive, but also has a deficiency. Observe in the 
example that between steps 5 and 6 there is only a small difference, but the index falls 
drastically, from + 167 . 0  to  200 . 0  . The reason for such a plunge lies in 
LY R , which appears as 
a deducting element in 
LY LY R RE V   . Recall that 
LY R  is based exclusively on pre-fiscal 
incomes, which do not change in our experiment and are the same all the way, once reranking 
has occurred. 
One intuitive choice, although not based on algebraic facts, was to draw a curve that also 
deducts reranking from the redistributive effect, but using 
AP R  instead of 
LY R . We obtained a 
measure 
AP R RE   (recall that 
AP K R RE V   ), which does have a quality of falling when the 
outranked person further loses her income, but there is no break in the turning point at the 5
th 
step. The latter is due to the fact that 
AP R  is based on post-fiscal incomes. 
4  Setting the new context for existing indices 
Problems with Kakwani and Lerman-Yitzhaki decompositions 
Kakwani (1984) and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) derived two different, but conceptually 
related decompositions of the redistributive effect (RE ) into vertical and reranking effects. The 
former became one of the most widely used tools in the analysis of the redistributive effect, 
while the latter aimed to replace it, but without success. Urban (2009) thoroughly describes their 
origins and debates on certain unsolved issues, which are dealt with extensively in the present 
paper. The decompositions are respectively represented by the following two equations. 
(54)    
AP K R V RE    
(55)    
LY LY R V RE    31 
 
Kakwani decomposes RE  into a difference between vertical and reranking effects, while 
Lerman and Yitzhaki decompose RE  into a sum of vertical and reranking effects. By 
construction, the reranking effects, 
AP R  and 
LY R , are always positive, while vertical effects may 
be either positive or negative.  
Based on the algebraic constructions of the formulas, the authors respectively concluded 
that 
AP R  contributes negatively, while 
LY R  contributes positively to the redistributive effect RE . 
For them, reranking plays a distinctive role in the determining the magnitude of  RE . For 
Kakwani, reranking deteriorates RE , while for Lerman-Yitzhaki it improves RE . For both 
Kakwani and Lerman-Yitzhaki, the respective vertical effects 
K V  and 
LY V  are also standalone 
concepts, completely independent of reranking. Kakwani (1984) identifies 
K V  with potential 
redistributive effect, interpreted as the amount of RE  that would be achieved in the absence of 
reranking. Thus, RE  could be increased through elimination of reranking, while at the same time 
K V  would remain unchanged. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) follow this interpretation, but in their 
version,  RE  could be enlarged through enhancement of reranking, while 
LY V  would stay the 
same. 
In the foregoing sections, we have provided a lot of material to answer the problem with 
these interpretations of indices. The principal concern is a specific connection between vertical 
and reranking effects. Each attempt to decrease (increase) overall reranking 
AP R  (
LY R ), 
automatically leads to a decrease (decrease) of vertical effect 
K V  (
LY V ). The consequence is that 
RE  remains unchanged.  
The most illustrative proof of this contention was the analysis of the impact of a series of 
transfers between population units which eliminate reranking. Further evidence about the relation 
between reranking and vertical effect is that 
K V  (
LY V ) is a sum (difference) of distance 
narrowing and reranking, as shown by equations (48) and (53). Recall that it was proven that 
distance narrowing and reranking are separate and independent concepts. 
These conclusions support Atkinson’s (1980) views that  “changes in the ranking of 
observations as a result of taxation do not in themselves affect the degree of inequality in the 
post-tax distribution”. In other words, since the distribution of pre-tax income is also assumed to 
be unchanged by taxation, Atkinson claimed that reranking does not influence the redistributive 32 
 
effect (RE ). However, the suggestion was ignored in the subsequent work of both Kakwani and 
Lerman and Yitzhaki. 
We have demonstrated another problem with the Kakwani decomposition, advanced by 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995), using an appealing example of taxation which makes a rich person 
poor. The Kakwani vertical effect (
K V ) rewards reranking, “asking for” an ever larger take from 
the formerly rich, now poor, and giving to the formerly poor, now the rich. At the same time, 
proponents of the Kakwani decomposition blame reranking for this trouble. If reranking were 
eliminated, the redistributive effect would increase to 
K V . But, as we have already seen, there is 
no practicable scheme that would tell us how to achieve this. 
Which indices to use? 
After a thorough discussion of the existing methodologies and criticism of their 
contemporary interpretations, a course for future research should be provided. A straight answer 
to the question posed by this section title will perhaps sound surprising: the same indices we used 
before; however, with an important distinction: they must be interpreted properly. In this section 
we discuss acceptable interpretations for each of these indices.  
Recall that we analyzed properties of the indices (of redistributive, vertical and reranking 
effects) using different approaches (vector transitions and income units’ “feelings”). Each of 
them revealed a certain interesting aspect of the measure the researchers should have in mind 
when clarifying the meaning of their estimated indicators. In Table 8 we summarize these 
aspects for five indices and two approaches, and then explain how each index should be treated. 
Table 8: Interpretation of indices 
  Vector transitions  Income units’ “feelings” 
RE   x X →
n N ; breaks the link between pre- and 
post-fiscal incomes 
distance narrowing;  
K V  
x X →
x N ; preserves the link between pre- and 
post-fiscal incomes. Decomposable into  
x X →
n N  and 
x n N N   
fiscal deprivation; 
x V  
AP R  
n N →
x N , reranks post-fiscal incomes  deprivation due to reranking; 
x R  
LY V  
n X →
n N ; preserves the link between pre- and 
post-fiscal incomes. Decomposable into 
n x N X   and 
n x X X   
reverse fiscal domination; 
n V  
LY R  
x X →
n X ; reranks pre-fiscal incomes  domination due to reranking; 
n R  33 
 
The redistributive effect (RE ). This will remain the main indicator of the redistributive 
effect.  RE  is synonymous with distance narrowing and is indifferent about rank changes. For 
two systems with equal distance narrowing ( RE   ) and different amounts of reranking, RE  
will be identical. Thus, analysts who do think that reranking has a negative or positive normative 
significance, will consider the indices below as a supplement to RE . 
Kakwani vertical effect 
K V . We have seen different problems with the index itself, and 
also with its contemporary interpretation . Should we completely avoid the use of 
K V ? In one of 
its forms, the index can still be interesting: as a measure of fiscal deprivation (
K x V V  ).  
Take an analyst who holds that the fiscal system should preserve differences in incomes. 
In other words, this principle says that everybody should pay (receive) equal amounts of taxes 
(benefits). Then, the index 
x V  measures the violation of this principle: positive fiscal deprivation 
means that the richer lost their income advantages over the poorer. Additionally, in case of 
reranking, the richer people not only use their income supremacy, but end up poorer, and this 
notion is captured by 
x V  as compared to RE . 
Atkinson-Plotnick reranking effect 
AP R . In the context of fiscal deprivation, 
x AP R R 2   is 
titled excess fiscal deprivation. It is a part of total fiscal deprivation (
x V ), that stands above the 
fraction of fiscal deprivation that is necessary to achieve actual distance narrowing ().  
This is perhaps an opportunity to divorce 
AP R  from 
K V , with whom it was unhappily 
married during the last 25 years. Unlike the other term, 
AP R  remains what it was since its 
appearance: an index measuring the extent of reranking caused by the fiscal process. It is a 
perfect complement of RE  in judging the redistributive performance of the fiscal system. 
Lerman-Yitzhaki vertical effect 
LY V  and reranking effect 
LY R . Lerman and Yitzhaki 
(1995) called 
LY V  the index of “gap-narrowing”, assuming that it quantifies a process that is 
independent of reranking. We have seen that the contention was wrong: 
LY V  decreases with the 
increase of reranking. In this paper, the similar term “distance narrowing” is used for a truly 
independent concept, measured by RE .  
Nevertheless, 
LY V  can be an interesting choice for the analyst who appreciates distance 
narrowing, but believes that pre-fiscal rankings should be preserved. 
LY V  is a single measure that 34 
 
combines both of these notions and is suitable for a comparison of performance of different 
fiscal systems. It is higher the larger the distance narrowing and the lower the reranking. 
LY R  can be used as a measure of reranking in the same way as 
AP R . Remember that the 
difference between the two lies in the income vector on which they are built: in the former case it 
is pre-fiscal income, and in the latter, post-fiscal income , which makes it slightly more intuitive.  
Analogously to 
K V (
x V ) and 
AP R (2
x R ), there are alternative interpretations for 
LY V  and 
LY R , in terms of fiscal domination. The reverse fiscal domination index 
LY n V V   is a 
counterpart to the index of fiscal deprivation, and suitable for analysts who consider that the 
fiscal process should insist on reranking of units, disrespecting pre-fiscal ranks. 
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6  Appendix 
 
EXAMPLE 1 
Table 9: Index of distance narrowing 
j i X X j i   ) , ( 1 M          j i N N j i   ) , ( 2 M  
B  30 150         B  100  20     
C  70 110  40       C  20 60 80     
D  8 172  22  62     D  40 40 60 20   
E  12 168  18  58  4   E  60 20 40 40 20 
   180  30  70  8       80  100  20  40 
    A B C D       A B C D 
The index of distance narrowing is obtained by (29) as a difference between the sums of 
values within triangles  1 M  and  2 M  of Table 9, multiplied by c. 
2693 . 0 ) 400 804 ( ) 60 5 (
1 2      
   
EXAMPLE 2 
Table 10: Indices of deprivation and domination due to reranking 
x
j i r j i , 1 ) , (  M        
n
j i r j i , 2 ) , (  M  
E  60 0         D  8  62     
B  100 0 0       E  12 58  0     
C  20 20 40 80     A  180 0 0 0   
A  80 0 0  20 0   B  30  40 0 0  150 
    40  60  100  20       70  8  12  180 
    D E B C       C D E A 
The triangle  1 M  in Table 10 contains values of 
x
j i r,  obtained by (22). There are four non-
zero values indicating the cases of reranking, for the following pairs of units (C,D), (C,E), (C,B) 




j N N  : units with pre-fiscal ranks i were outranked 
or deprived by those with ranks  j . Total deprivation due to reranking of the unit C with the pre-
fiscal rank  4  i  is equal to  ) ( 4 1
x x N N  ) ( 4 2
x x N N   ) ( 4 3
x x N N   =140, and deprivation of the 
unit A, with the pre-fiscal rank  5  i , is  ) ( 5 4
x x N N  =20. 36 
 
The triangle  2 M  in Table 10 contains values of 
n
j i r,  obtained by (26). Again, there are 
four non-zero values, for the pairs (D,C), (E,C), (B,C) and (B,D). Notice that these are the same 




j X X  : the units with post-fiscal rankings i outranked or dominated those with rankings  j . 
Total domination due to reranking over the unit C with the post-fiscal rank  1  j  is  ) ( 2 1
n n X X   
) ( 3 1
n n X X   ) ( 5 1
n n X X   =160, and of the unit A, with the post-fiscal rank  4  j , is 
) ( 5 4
n n X X  =150. 
The indices of deprivation and domination due to reranking are calculated according to 
(30) and (32), respectively, summing the values inside  1 M  and  2 M , and multiplying them by c. 
1067 . 0 160 ) 60 5 (
1 2    
  x R  
2067 . 0 310 ) 60 5 (
1 2    
  n R  
EXAMPLE 3 
Table 11: Fiscal deprivation and domination indices 
x
j i j i , 1 ) , (   M        
n
j i j i , 2 ) , (   M  
E  -16         D  82     
B  -38 -22          E  98 16     
C  82 98  120         A  -50 -132 -148   
A  132 148 170  50       B  120 38 22  170 
  D E B C         C D E A 
The triangle  1 M  in Table 11 contains values of 
x
j i,   obtained by (23). The triangle  2 M  
contains values of 
n
j i,   obtained by (27). The indices of fiscal deprivation and domination can be 
easily calculated using (31) and (33), respectively, summing the values in  1 M  and  2 M  
multiplying them with c. 
4827 . 0 724 ) 60 5 (
1 2    
  x V  
1440 . 0 216 ) 60 5 (
1 2      
  n V  
 